Risk and Loss Prevention for the Oil and Gas Industry
Inherently Safer Design | Eliminating Hazards early on at Concept Design Stage | Cost vs. How much Safer it is
We are back. It’s been a long break and many rights issues. But that’s being sorted It’s a Sunday. I’m having my coffee while writing this. The coffee is on another table. Not the one my laptop sits on. Well ok it’s not about the coffee in itself. It’s the hazard of spilling it. If its spills (and it’s happened before) it’s going to wreck my laptop. So separating it out has its merits. Simple enough in its application right, separating out your hazards to where it poses less of a risk.
An oil and gas project has a life of its own. It starts with concept selection. What is concept selection? Concept selection is the start where you weigh your options then proceed with your design. Your options could be many, it could be wellheads simply connecting to a Central Processing Platform (CPP) and then an export out. It could be wellheads connecting to a riser platform then an FPSO. It could be multiple wellheads connecting to an onshore facility. It could risers from wellhead, CPP and bridge linked LQ and an export all the way onshore. You get the idea right… Now it’s best to catch hazards and manage them out during this stage. The only problem is how and what does inherent safer design and coffee hazard mean in all of it.
Exhaust Plumes | Why You Don’t Have to Use PHAST, HGSYTEM or FLACS to Model | There is a Better Way of Modelling Exhaust Plumes to Follow the CFD goal set forth by CAP 437 .
Why dont you use another CFD software which is free and better
Jet Fire Radiation Models | What’s Going on in the Software’s Around You | Radiation Models for PHAST, FlareSim and Comparison and Why You Probably Should not be Using PHAST for Flare Radiation Calculations.
Chamberlain models vs what is used in Flaresim and why its advices not to use PHAST for Flare calculations
Deluge On Confirmed Gas | Disadvantages or Maybe Advantages of Activating Deluge On Gas | Explosion Hazard or Explosion Mitigation
Some years back Shell came out with a booklet (or more like pages of brochure) that said if you deluge you increase blast overpressures. It’s still controversial to this date. Seems like some say yes, some say no. The thing is it all depends on the droplet sizes during deluge, it also depends on flame front propagation. Very subjective parameters. Ok lets start with exactly what Shell DEP says (2005 edition)...
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'There is a belief by some in the industry that explosion hazards may be effectively mitigated by activation of the water deluge system upon gas detection. Experiments have shown that water droplets can indeed be made to interact with a developing explosion to limit flame speeds and reduce over-pressure. To interact effectively with the flame front of a developing explosion the water must be in the form of very fine droplets. However, such small droplets may get swept ahead of the flame and never interact with it. By contrast, large water droplets, of the size produced by deluge systems, have sufficient inertia to not be swept away rapidly and if flow speeds are sufficiently high they are broken up into small droplets by the accelerating gas flow ahead of the flame front, and are then conveniently placed to interact with the flame front. Thus there is a mechanism by which water deluge systems can mitigate gas explosions but there are disadvantages as well as potential benefits. |
More Articles...
- Offshore Quantitative Risk Assessment| QRA Process and Non Hydrocarbon Hazard Analysis (NHHA) | Analyzing Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) and PLL (Potential Loss of Life) for an Offshore Installation
- Impairment Frequencies | Offshore Risk Criteria
- Onshore Explosion | Deflagration vs Detonation | PHAST Modelling
- Offshore Fire Protection | Overall Active and Passive Fire Protection Strategy for an Offshore Installation | Some Discussion on NOVEC as well
- Safety Philosophy and Concept Development | Why High Level Safety Goals Are So Important at the Start
- Hazards and Risk, HAZOP and SIL | Hazard and Operability Study and LOPA
- Hazard Identification (HAZID) & Risk Assessment | Understanding your Hazards and Reducing Your Risks | HAZOP as Well
- Dropped Object Risk | Why Dropping it is Not an Option| Flexible Riser, Rigid Riser and Pipelines
- Offshore Helideck Design | Helicopters and Exhaust Plumes | Helideck Design the CAP 437 Way
- Offshore Explosion Risk Assessment | Gamble it the Monte Carlo Way
- Impingement Time | Time to failure of Critical Systems - Pressure Vessel, Fire Water Lines, etc
- Frequencies Marries Consequence| Pipeline Risk - Frequencies Depend On Consequence
- Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standard| WhatS The MAE About
- Jet Fires Modelling | Why PHAST sucks at Jet Fires
- QRA Frequencies For Various Hole Size| Hole Size Distribution Formula (HCR Database)
- Hazardous Area Classification| Zone 1, Zone 2, Gas Groups and IP 15
- Offshore Well Blowout | Drilling, SIMOPS SINTEF Blowout frequencies
- Subsea SSIV | A Risk Based Approach to The Safest Location for an SSIV
- Flare Radiation | Calculating and Optimising Stack Heights
- Probit Model | Radiation Fatality Model
