Risk and Loss Prevention for the Oil and Gas Industry
It’s a Sunday. I’m having my coffee while writing this. The coffee is some distance away at an arm’s length from the laptop. If it spills (and it’s happened before) it’s not going to wreck my laptop. Separating it a distance away has its merits. It’s inherent and plain for all to see that the laptop is safe from that hazard. The risk has been eliminated. It’s not control we are talking about but elimination. We are not going to run through the various strategies involved in an inherently safer design i.e. substitute, minimize, moderate and simplify. The intent herein is simply to discuss various guidelines out there in the industry and to focus on concepts, some layout etc.
An oil and gas project has a life of its own. It’s an offshore project we are talking about here. It starts with concept selection. Concept selection is the start where you weigh your options then proceed with your design. Your options could be many, it could be wellheads simply connecting to a Central Processing Platform (CPP) with an export pipeline. It could be wellheads connecting to a riser platform then an FPSO. It could be multiple wellheads connecting to an onshore facility. It could risers from wellhead, CPP and bridge linked LQ and an export all the way onshore. You get the idea right…the vast permutations on concept selection is endless and so is the realisation of intolerable risk careless. Now it’s best to catch hazards and manage them out during this stage. Why not right, its much cheaper to do at this at an early stage then to struggle at the detail design stage with mitigation measures. Some typical guidewords or more like ideas are below.
Naturally at every opportunity there would be a push back from other teams on it. Like a simple rotation of the entire platform at an early stage to optimize prevalent winds would still result in many changes such as routing of pipelines etc. Things like challenging the drilling guys on the need for SIMOPS would be a serious challenge. These guys think the world revolve around them so it could be tough…
Jet Fire Radiation Models | What’s Going on in the Software’s Around You | Radiation Models for PHAST, FlareSim and Comparison and Why You Probably Should not be Using PHAST for Flare Radiation Calculations.
Chamberlain models vs what is used in Flaresim and why its adviced not to use PHAST for Flare calculations
Offshore Quantitative Risk Assessment| QRA Process and Non Hydrocarbon Hazard Analysis (NHHA) | Analyzing Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) and PLL (Potential Loss of Life) for an Offshore Installation
An Offshore QRA has 2 large parts to it... Helicopter transport contributes to the non hydrocarbon risk. Then we have the process hydrocarbon part
Offshore QRA has 2 important parts to it. The process hydrocarbon part and the non process hydrocarbon part (NHHA). The NHHA concerns assessing risk for ; Transportation (helicopter, boat), Ship Collision, Occupational, Earthquakes and some others. The process risk analysis concerns main process lines and risk associated with it. The bible for many years has been CMPT and John Spouge. The embedded redirected link.
But is an Offshore QRA even useful ? Yes if it is done well and in a more conservative and less complicated way.
Impairment frequencies what does it mean ? Design Accidental Load (DAL) what does that mean ? The DNV-A-101 document states the following (link below);
Any guesses, the image on your left…
Courtesy of Lees ; "At about 4.53 p.m. on Saturday1st June 1974, the Flixborough Works of Nypro (UK) Ltd (Nypro) were virtually demolished by an explosion of war-like dimensions. Of those working on the site at the time, 28 were killed and 36 others suffered injuries. If the explosion had occurred on an ordinary working day, many more people would have been on the site, and the number of casualties would have been much greater.
Offshore Fire Protection | Overall Active and Passive Fire Protection Strategy for an Offshore Installation | Some Discussion on NOVEC as well
Living Quarters, Battery Rooms, Cabinet Rooms, Central Control Room, Electrical , Process Areas. So what do they have in common – fires. Perhaps, but the type of fires can vary quite some. But they all need to be protected from various fires.
|Some commonality but the active fire protection is actually rather different. Process areas have hydrocarbon fires, the other don’t – this actually is quite critical.|
- Safety Philosophy and Concept Development | Why High Level Safety Goals Are So Important at the Start
- Hazards and Risk, HAZOP and SIL | Hazard and Operability Study and LOPA
- Hazard Identification (HAZID) & Risk Assessment | Understanding your Hazards and Reducing Your Risks | HAZOP as Well
- Offshore Helideck Design | Helicopters and Exhaust Plumes | Helideck Design the CAP 437 Way
- Offshore Explosion Risk Assessment | Gamble it the Monte Carlo Way
- Impingement Time | Time to failure of Critical Systems - Pressure Vessel, Fire Water Lines, etc
- Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standard| WhatS The MAE About
- Jet Fires Modelling | Why PHAST sucks at Jet Fires
- QRA Frequencies For Various Hole Size| Hole Size Distribution Formula (HCR Database)
- Hazardous Area Classification| Zone 1, Zone 2, Gas Groups and IP 15
- Offshore Well Blowout | Drilling, SIMOPS SINTEF Blowout frequencies
- Subsea SSIV | A Risk Based Approach to The Safest Location for an SSIV
- Probit Model | Radiation Fatality Model
- Subsea Pipeline Dropped Object Risk Assessment
- Yellow Book | TNO Explosion | Jet Fire Modelling Guide